Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1988

Lorraine Miller v. R.O.A. General Inc : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Suzanne Marelius; Littlefidl & Peterson; Attorney for Appellant.
Douglas T. Hall; Attorney for Respondent.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Miller v. R.O.A. General Inc, No. 880466 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1277

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
I

I T

* "•••••*

DOCKET NO

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

LORRAINE MILLER,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

Docket No. 880466-CA

R.O.A. GENERAL, INC., a Utah
Corporation, formerly known as
Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc.,
a Utah Corporation,

Priority No. 14

Defendant/Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

On Appeal from the Order of
the Third Judicial District Court in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah
the Honorable Raymond S. Uno

SUZANNE MARELIUS
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

DOUGLAS T. HALL
1775 North, 900 West
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorney for Appellant

Attorney for Respondent

DLLii

84116

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

LORRAINE MILLER,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
Docket No. 880466-CA

vs.
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC., a Utah
Corporation, formerly known as
Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc.,
a Utah Corporation,

Priority No. 14

Defendant/Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

On Appeal from the Order of
the Third Judicial District Court in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah
the Honorable Raymond S. Uno

SUZANNE MARELIUS
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

DOUGLAS T. HALL
1775 North, 900 West
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorney for Appellant

Attorney for Respondent

84116

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

. . . . ii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

. . . . 1

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED

. • 4

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

6

ARGUMENT
I.
II.

There Are No Genuine Issues as to AnyMaterial Facts

6

The Agreement, When Interpreted Using
Correct Enclish Rules of Construction,
Clearly Extends the Lease for a
Ten-Year Period
....

9

III. The Lease is Not Ambiguous
IV.
V.

13

The Lease is Not Illusory or
Unconscionable

18

Reagan Outdoor Advertising is Entitled
to Judgment as a Matter of Law.

. . . . 22

CONCLUSION

24

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

26

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases

Baker v. McDei Coup., 191 N.W.2d 846 (Wis. 1971)

. . .

, . 10

Briggs v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 2HI (Ul *1. /lf^ . 1987)

7

Credit Collection Control Corp. v. Grayson,
7 Wash. App. 56, 499 P.2d 57 (1972)

23

Colonial Leasing Co. v. Larsen Bros. Construction,
731 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986)

15

Copher v. Barbee, 361 S.W.2d 137, 145
(Ct. App. Mo. 1962)

17

Ephraim Theatre Company v. Hawk,
321 P.2d 221 (Utah 1958)

10

Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292 (Utah 1983)

17

Hampton v. Lum, 544 S.W.2d 839
(Civ. Ct. App. Tex. 1976) . . . .
Heglcu Ranch, Inc., v. Stillman,

16

619 P.2d 1390 (Utah 1980)

22

Jackson v. Dadney, 645 P.2d 613 (Utah 1982)

. ,

. . . . . .

Logan v. Time Oil Company, 437 P.2d 192 (Wash. 1968) . . . .

7
22

Marcrum v. Eambry, 262 ••-.:.?• ^ n S ; 282 So. 2nd 49, »: (1873) . . 19
Maitinez ;, Rocky Mountain & San Francisco Railway Co.,
<P P.2d 903 (N.M. 1935)
.
Mel Hardman Productions, inc., v. Robinson,
604 P.2d 91 3 (Utah 1979)
Overson v. W.S. Fidelity & Guaranty, Co.,
587 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1978)
Peters v. Watson Co., 241 P.2d 441 (Wash. 1952)
Resource Management Company v. Weston Ranch and Livestock
Company, Inc., 706 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1985)
Russell v. Valentine, 376 P.2d 548 (1962)
ii

17
18
23
13
18
. 14

St. Lou. s :•;*'. Francisco Railway Co. v. Bengal Lumber Co.,
29.
- ?* " (Okla. 1930
.

10

Themy v, Seagull Enterprises, Inc.,
595 P.2d 526 (Utah 1979)
Thornock <, , Cook, 604 P.2d 934, 936 (Utai

22
.:

•

7

Wa r i P n ^f . f^ay Conn t y Co 1 e Co , 2 0 7 S , W. a 8 >? 2 0 0 Mo .
App , 44/ (1919).
Western Empire Petroleum Company v. Davenport,
318 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. App. 1958)

19
.10

Young v. Bridwell, 437 P.2d 686 (1968) . . , , , , , , . . . . 14
Statutes and Rules
Utah Rules r: f
Utah Rules

* )cedure, Rule 56(c).

,

• ,

Rule 56(e). . . . . , . , . . .

7
7

Treatises
Restatement

,,-J of. « w' !;aets, Para. 202(3) (a) . . . . . . . .

7 Am.Jur.2d Para, 20.1. ( Attorneys at: Lav

*„

Other Sources
W e b s t e r ' s N i n t h Mew C o l l e e n a t e :.:•':
-.y . .
Webster's Third New International Dictionary
, , .
Tl le Elements of style, Strunk and White, 3rd Edition

iii

1
1
, . . , 1

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals is proper
pursuant to rules 3 and 4A of the Rules of the Utah Court
of Appeals.

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

This is the original appeal from a decision
rendered in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, Judge
Presiding.

The Court, on April 4, 1988, entered a final

order granting Defendant's Motion for a Summary Judgment
and denying the Plaintiff's Motion for a Summary Judgment.
The Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal in the
Supreme Court of the State of Utah on the 4th day of May,
1988.

On July 29, 1988, this case was poured-over to the

Court of Appeals for disposition.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

The Respondent submits that the issues on appeal
before this Court are as follows:
1.

Whether the lower Court correctly ruled

that the lease agreement contains terms that are clear and
unequivocal on its face, and therefore unambiguous and

1

binding upon the parties.
2.

Whether the Lower Court correctly ruled

that there was no unconscionability at the time the lease
was entered into, and that the succeeding lessors failed
to show present unconscionability.
3.

Whether the Lower Court correctly ruled

that a succeeding lessor is bound by a lease agreement,
whose terms are clear and unequivocal when the lease
agreement specifically states that the agreement is
binding upon successors in interest and when the successor
has actual knowledge of the lease agreement.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
None

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Plaintiff and Appellant, Lorraine Miller,
filed a complaint on July 28, 1987, seeking a Declaratory
Judgment against the Defendant and Respondent, R.O.A.
General, Inc., (Reagan Outdoor Advertising).

Miller

attempted to terminate an advertising lease agreement
entered into by Reagan Outdoor Advertising and Lorraine
Miller's predecessor in interest, William Jennings.
Appellant hoped to obtain a ruling that Reagan was
2

trespassing.
The parties filed memoranda setting forth their
respective position.

On December 1, 1987, oral arguments

were heard by Judge Uno.

Following oral argument the

Court requested supplemental information to assist the
Court in its decision.

On January 4, 1988, Judge Uno

issued his Memorandum Decision, denying Miller's Motion
and granting Reagan's Motion for a Summary Judgment.
Accordingly, Reagan Outdoor Advertising's interest has
been judicially recognized.
Following entry of the Judgment with
accompanying Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the
Plaintiff timely filed her Notice of Appeal to the Supreme
Court of Utah.

The case has been transferred to the Utah

Court of Appeals for disposition.

STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED

1.

The Defendant/Respondent, Reagan Outdoor

Advertising, maintains an outdoor advertising structure,
sometimes called a "billboard", on the premises located at
2735 South, 20th East, in Salt Lake City, State of Utah.
(R. 33)
2.

This outdoor advertising structure was

erected pursuant to a lease agreement between Reagan and a
3

Mr. William M. Jennings, executed on April 29, 1977.
(R.29)
3e

Subsequent to the execution of the lease

agreement the property upon which the outdoor advertising
structure was located was sold by Mr. Jennings to Gloria
Erickson who thereafter sold the property to the
Plaintiff/ Respondent, Lorraine Miller (hereinafter
"Miller").

(R.79)

At the time Miller acquired the

subject premises she was aware of the lease agreement and
that she was bound by its terms. (R.33-34, 91)
4.

Miller believed that the lease could not be

"broken", but that it would "expire" in May of 1987.
(R.35)
5.

Since acquiring the property Miller has

received regular rental payments pursuant to the lease
agreement. (R.36)
6.

Miller believed that she could terminate

the lease after 10 years. (R.86)
7.

In parciyiaph 4 (unnumbered) of the subject

lease agreement it provides:
This lease shall continue on the same terms
and conditions for a like successive period;
thereafter, this lease shall continue in
full force on the same terms and conditions
for a like successive period or periods,
unless lessor delivers to lessee notice of
termination within 90 days of the end of
said term. (R.29)
4

The Lower Court found that the Reagan Outdoor
Advertising, Inc., contract (or lease agreement) was
neither a long nor complicated contract. (R.220)
8.

Further, the Lower Court found that the

terms of the contract were clear and unequivocal; that the
term of the lease was designated in a separate paragraph
in plain and understandable language; and, the agreement
consisting of only one page could be read, very slowly, in
five (5) minutes. (R.222)
9.

The Lower Court found that there is no

question that the lease is a 10 year lease and, more
importantly, that upon careful reading of the lease
anyone, including a lay person, would understand that
there is an option to continue the lease for a "like
successive period" to be exercised by the lessee. (R.222)
10.

The Court found that some attention was

paid to this term of the lease because the Miller
affidavits so state "their" understanding.
11.

(R.222)

The Court did not find that the lease was

unconscionable at the time it was entered into or that it
became unconscionable because of subsequent events.
(R.223)
12.

Additionally, in reviewing similar language

in a similar lease in another case it was stated that this
5

language "does not appear to be ambiguous or misleading".
(R.42)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The decision of the Lower Court granting
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment should be affirmed
because there are no genuine issues as to any material
fact in the instant case and the Defendant is entitled to
a Judgment as a matter of law.

The lease agreement

between the parties is not ambiguous.

The provision in

the lease which provides for a continuation of the term of
the lease is set forth clearly, using correct English
rules of construction and was properly interpreted by the
Lower Court.
The lease is not illusory nor unconscionable.
Both parties to the lease have certain obligations that
they are required to perform, or otherwise comply with, as
well as receiving mutual benefits from the agreement.

ARGUMENT
I
There Are No Genuine Issues as to Any Material Facts
The Standard of review by an appellant court of
a summary judgment is the same as that of the trial court:
Our inquiry on review is whether there is
6

any genuine issue as to any material fact,
and if there is not, whether the plaintiffs
are entitled to judgment as a matter of law
• . . . The defendant cannot rely upon the
mere allegations or denials of her pleadings
to avoid a summary judgment but must set
forth specific facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial.
Thornock v. Cook,
also

604 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1979).

See

Briggs v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281 (Utah App. 1987) (on

reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court applies
the same standard as that applied by the trial court);
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
requires that a motion for summary judgment shall be
granted if the:
pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact . . .
Utah's Supreme Court has held that a genuine issue of
facts exists whenever reasonable minds can differ.
Jackson v. Dadney, 645 P.2d 613 (Utah 1982).

In

The opponent

to summary judgment must affirmatively set forth genuine
issues of fact.

Rule 56(e)

In opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment, Plaintiff attempted to cloud the genuine issues
by presenting three affidavits, which are appended as
Exhibits "D", "E", and

lf ff

F

to Appellant's Brief.

These

Affidavits do not raise any genuine issue of fact, but
instead present incompetent evidence to the Court.

7

Rule 56(e) requires that Affidavits be based on
personal knowledge, setting forth "such facts as would be
admissible in evidence*"

Appellant's Affidavits are

replete with hearsay evidence, many of the statements
prefaced by "I was told . . ."or "I learned from . . . ."
Such statements are contrary to the Rules of Evidence, and
raise no genuine issues of fact.
Plaintiff also submitted title insurance
policies and attorney letters to show the duration of the
Lease.

Such evidence is mere private interpretation of

the Lease Agreement.

It is the duty of the Court, not

some title company or attorney, to interpret the terms of
the Lease Agreement.
On appeal, Appellant's Statement of Facts again
raise no genuine issues of fact.

(Appellant's Brief,

pp.3, 4 ) . Appellant states that she was "informed . . .
that the billboard lease term was ten years . . .", a
statement resounding of hearsay.

(Appellant's brief, p.

4, paragraph 3 ) . Even if Appellant were told this
information, it is not a material fact precluding summary
judgmpnt.

Appellant is a succpssor in interest, and her

understanding of the contract is of no importance.

The

intent of the contracting parties governs.
Similarly, no evidence was presented showing
unconscionability, either at the time of entering the
contract or at the present time.
8

II

The Agreement, When Interpreted Using Correct
English Rules of Construction, Clearly Extends the Lease
for a Ten-Year Period.
In her brief, Appellant has reproduced a
paragraph from the Lease Agreement in question.
(Appellant's Brief, page 5). Appellant has mistakenly,
perhaps intentionally, altered the punctuation the the
crucial paragraph, substituting a comma for a semicolon.
The paragraph should read:
This lease shall continue on the same
terms and conditions for a like successive
period; thereafter, this lease shall
continue in full force on the same terms
and conditions for a like successive
period or periods, unless lessor delivers
to lessee notice of termination within
ninety days of the end of said term.
Lease Agreement, paragraph 4.
The semicolon in this phrase is a proverbial
linchpin—without it, the entire paragraph is subject to
modification by the last 17 worrls.

with thp correct

punctuation, only the post-semicolon clause is so
modified.

A contract must be interpreted in accordance
with the generally prevailing meanings and rules of
9

language.

See Restatement 2d of Contracts,

paragraph(3)(a), and comments thereunder.

This principal

has been recognized by the Utah Supreme Court,
Generally speaking, neither of the parties,
nor the court has any right to ignore or
modify conditions which are clearly expressed
merely because it may subject one of the
parties to hardship, but they must be enforced
"in accordance with the intentions . . .
manifest by the language used by the parties
to the contract."
Ephraim Theatre Company v. Hawk, 321 P.2d 221, 223, (Utah
1958) .

"Language" includes not only words, but also
methods of combining words.

Webster's Ninth New

Collegiate Dictionary, p. 672.

Clearly, punctuation is

part of the English language in written form.
A court cannot ignore punctuation when
interpreting a contract.
846, 851 (Wis. 1971).

Baker v. McDel Corp., 191 N.W.2d

It is fair to assume that parties

to a contract know and understand grammar, punctuation,
words, phrases, and clauses chosen by them to convey the
purpose of their contract.

St. Louis - San Francisco

Railway Co. v. Bengal Lumber, Co., 292 P.2d 52, 53 (Okla.
1930.

A semicolon is significant when interpreting a

contract.

See Western Empire Petroleum Company v.

Davenport, 318 S.W.2d 903, 904 (Tex. App. 1958).

The paragraph in question is made of a single
10

compound sentence that includes two independent clauses
joined by a semicolon and adverb.

Each of the clauses

could individually make a complete sentence, i.e., "This
lease shall continue on the same terms and conditions for
a like successive period.

This lease shall continue in

full force on the same terms and conditions for a like
successive period or periods, unless the lessor delivers
to the lessee notice of termination within 90 days of the
end of said term."

Grammatically, the two clauses are

complete and independent one from the other.

The second

clause does not modify the first clause.
Furthermore, the two clauses cannot be joined
into a compound sentence unless a semicolon is used.

A

comma is inappropriate.
If two or more clauses grammatically complete
and not joined by a conjunction are to form
a single compound sentence, the proper mark of
punctuation is a semicolon . . . .
Note that if the second clause is preceded by an
adverb, such as accordingly, besides, then,
therefore, or thus, and not by a conjunction,
the semicolon is still required.

The Elements of Stylo, "trunk and White, 3rd
Edition, McMillan Publishing Co., Inc., New York, 1979.
Webster further clarifies the proper use of the
semicolon.
In general the semicolon functions as a weak
period or as a strong comma . . . .
11

As a weak period a semicolon usually separates
two statements or clauses when the second begins
with a sentence connector or conjunctive adverb
as . . . therefore . . .
Webster's Third New International Dictionary, p. 49a
In the paragraph in question, the semicolon is a
"weak period", showing the independency of the two
clauses.

The two clauses are joined by a semicolon and

the adverb "therefore", making one compound sentence, but
in no way affecting the independency of the two clauses.
The correct interpretation of the language of
the contract leads to but one conclusion, that is, the
lease is still in full force and effect.

The lease

agreement was for an initial period of ten years.

(Lease,

paragraph 3 ) , Upon expiration of the first ten-year
period, the lease continues for a successive ten-year
period.

(Lease, paragraph 4, Clause 1, before semicolon).

There is no provision allowing the Lessor to terminate the
lease until the expiration of the second ten-year period,
at which time the lessor may opt to terminate with
adequate notice.

(Lease, paragraph 4, Clause 2, following

semicolon).

Finally, the Washington Supreme Court has
recognized the importance of punctuation.
It is urged that the comma is the lowest and
least significant of all punctuation marks
and that in this case it should simply be
eliminated or moved to the right three words.
We must confess, however, to a very high regard
12

for the lowly comma. When a contract has a
clear and certain meaning, we will not, in the
absence of fraud or mutual mistake, neither of
which is supported here, make a new contract
for the parties be eliminating a comma or
moving it a certain number of words to the right
or left.
Peters v. Watson Co., 241 P.2d 441 (Wash. 1952).
Plaintiff/Appellant should not be permitted to
redraft the contract by eliminating the efficacious
semicolon.

Ill
The Lease is not Ambiguous
Appellant contests that the language of
paragraph 4 of the lease is ambiguous, unconscionable, and
creates a perpetual lease.

She argues that the ambiguity

of the paragraph is proven by the fact that she personally
reviewed the lease, obtained legal opinions, reviewed the
title report and received assurances from her seller,
Gloria Erickson.

It is interesting to note that

she, at no time prior to the initiation of these
proceedings, contacted Reacran Outdoor Advertising to
determine its

understanding of its rights and liabilities

under this particular lease agreement were.
Personal and professional review of a contract
does not alter the original intent of the parties and the
legal, binding effect of the writing.
13

Even the best

attorney in town takes a back seat to a judge when it
comes to interpreting a legal document.

A judge is also

bound to construe the document according to age-old rules
of interpretation.

Attorney opinions sought that the

lessor could terminate the lease after the first ten year
term is an argument that is at best tenuous.

On this

point, the law is clear—it is not a defense to rely on
the advice and counsel of an attorney contrary to law. See
7 Am.Jur.2d Section 201, Attorneys at Law (1980) (in
absence of express agreement, an attorney is not an
insurer or guarantor of the soundness of his opinion, or
of the successful outcome of litigation, or of the
validity of an instrument he is engaged to draft); and
Young v. Bridwell, 437 P.2d 686 (1968).

(Counsel is

required to possess the ordinary legal knowledge and skill
common to members of his profession, but he is not
required to know all of the law, nor to second guess the
trial judge).
Miller has failed to set forth facts to support
the contention that the lease is ambiguous.
has merely alleged ambiqui. < y.

Instead, she

Appellant cites Russell v,

Valentine, 376 P.2d 548 (1962) for the premise that when
lease renewal provisions are not clear they should be
construed against the drafter.

Appellant argues that this

case is applicable to the case at bench, but she fails to
pinpoint the ambiguity.

14

The Valentine case is distinguishable from the
present case, because the language of the present lease
agreement is clear and unequivocal.

In Valentine, the

controversial language of the lease stated that "said
Lessee shall have the right to renew this lease for a
further period beginning as of the termination of this
lease."

The court, construing this language held:
The crux of the matter is the phrase "for
a further period." We agree with defendant,
and plaintiff so concedes, that had the
renewal provision not contained these words
it could be construed as a "general covenant
to renew" for an additional term of ten
years. . . . However, the lease provision
does contain the phrase and it could have a
variety of meanings. "For a further period"
could mean one day, one week, one month, one
year, and so on. The phrase renders the
provision so ambiguous and uncertain that
its meaning and the intention of the parties
must be sought outside the four corners of
the lease.

Id. at 549.
The language under consideration in this case
does not render the lease so ambiguous and uncertain.
"For a like successive period," unlike "for a further
period," clearly indicates that the period has only one
meaning—a succeeding ten year term under identical terms
as the preceding one.

Consequently, summary judgment was

proper in this case, because the terms are clear and
unambiguous and reasonable minds could differ as to this
fact.

As this court held in Colonial Leasing Co. v.

Larsen Bros. Construction, 731 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986):
Only when contract terms are complete,
15

clear, and unambiguous can they be
interpreted by the judge on a motion for
summary judgment. . . . If the evidence
as to the terms of the agreement is in
conflict, the intent of the parties as to
the terms of the agreement is to be
determined by the jury.
Id. at 488.
A case that is on point is Hampton v. Lum, 544
S.W.2d 839 (Civ. Ct. App. Tex. 1976), where the Lower
Court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant/
Tenant.

The single point of error urged on appeal was

over a lease provision very similar to the one in this
case.

The provision read:
"at the expiration of the original
lease term herein, this lease shall
automatically renew for a like term
unless either party gives thirty (30)
days written notice to the contrary"
(emphasis added)

Id. at 840.
The court stated:

"Appellant urges that the

words like term in paragraph 14 renders the provisions of
the paragraph ambiguous, unclear and meaningless."

Id.

The court rejected the appellant's argument and held that:
"Neither the words 1 i k e t e r m nm; i he paragraph in which
they appear renders the agreement ambiguous, vague or
meaningless."

Id.

Instead, the court found that the

phrase "like term" had a clear and understandable meaning:
As the word is used in the context shown
term means the interest or estate created
by the lease instrument and the estate's
duration. In using the words like term
16

in paragraph 14, the parties agree that
at the expiration therein and its duration
of twelve months would automatically renew.
Id.

See also Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292 (Utah

1983) (when a contract is clear on its face, extraneous or
parole evidence is generally not admissible to explain the
intent of the contract).
Similarly, the subject of controversy in this
case is the phrase "like successive period" and/or "said
term".

Plaintiff argues that the phrase are ambiguous

and, should be construed against the maker of the
instrument.

However, much like the situation in Lum,

"Like successive period" is not ambiguous but clearly
creates a renewal at the expiration of the first period,
in this case ten years.
The word "period" is the equivalent of "term".
Lum; see also Martinez v. Rocky Mountain & San Francisco
Railway Co., 47 P.2d 903 (N.M. 1935) (the lexicographers
generally give "period" as a synonym of "term").

Any

reference to "said term" is the same as a reference to
"said period".

The word "successive" means automatic,

without any gap or time lapse between the initial period
and the following one.

As held by one court, "Successive

is synonymous with 'consecutive' and means 'following each
other or another without interruption or interval.'"
Copher v. Barbee, 361 S.W.2d 137, 145 (Ct.App.Mo. 1962).
Thus, the phrase "for like successive period" even more
clearly sets forth what the court held in Lum—that the
17

lease was intended to renew automatically, without
interval, for an identical, subsequent period.

IV
The Lease is Not Illusory or Unconscionable

The lease agreement is not illusory.

Reagan

Outdoor Advertising is obligated to pay quarterly rent
payments or else it is in breach of the lease.

Appellant

would have sufficient legal remedies to terminate the
contract upon Reagan's breach.

Reagan Outdoor Advertising

is obligated to pay the lease payments whether the sign is
in use or not, and Reagan cannot terminate the lease on
its whim.

The contract expressly penalizes Reagan for its

termination, requiring the payment of one year's rent as a
penalty.

Furthermore, Reagan would have a legal duty to

remove its structure from the property, at its own cost.
The contract cannot be deemed illusory because if Reagan
were to terminate, monetary and other obligations arise by
contract and by law.
The argument made by the appellant could likely
be made with regard to almost any contractual agreement.
Courts have dealt with this by simply providing a
requirement that all parties are expected to deal with
each other in good faith . Mel Hardman Productions, Inc.,
v. Robinson, 604 P.2d 913 (Utah 1979).
18

See also Resource

Management Company v. Weston Ranch and Livestock Company/
Inc., 706 P.2d 1028, 1037 (Utah 1985).

The issue of

Reagan Outdoor Advertising's potential breach of the lease
agreement is not before the courtAppellant has attempted to make it appear that
Reagan Outdoor Advertising is getting something for
nothing.

This is simply not the case.

The instant lease

is an arrangement that not only lays certain obligations
on both of the parties but provides a benefit for both
parties.
Furthermore, an agreement is not invalid, simply
because it gives a lone party the right to terminate the
lease.
(1873).

Marcrum v. Eambry, 262 Ala. 406, 282 So.2nd 49,52
Nor, is a lease invalid simply because a lessor

cannot terminate the lease until the end of the second
renewal period.

It is not necessary that every covenant

in a contract be equal for the consideration of mutuality
to be sufficient.

Warren v. Ray County Cole Co., 207 S.W.

883, 200 Mo. App. 442 (1919).
Miller also a reruns l-h^t- f.ho lease is
unconscionable, because "it is terminable at the will of
one party, the option of the Defendant, and is so
one-sided as to destroy any implied good faith
limitation."
Appellant relies on the case of Resource
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Management Company v. Weston Ranch and Livestock Company
Inc., supra.

That case divides unconscionability into two

categories:
Recognition of these purposes has led
to an analysis of unconscionability
in terms of "substantive" and
"procedural" unconscionability.
"Substantive unconscionability"
examines the relative fairness of
the obligations assumed. "Procedure
unconscionability" focuses on the
manner in which the contract was
negotiated and the circumstances of
the parties.
Id. at 1041.
The critical juncture for determining whether a
contract is unconscionable is a moment when it is entered
into by both parties.

Id. at 1043.

The lower court specifically looked at
unconscionability not only when the agreement is entered
into by the original parties but also during that period
of time since the agreement was executed.

There is no

factual basis for unconscionability in either instance.
The Appellant also fails to show how the Resource
Management Company case has a direct application to the
instantcase.
The term of the lease under question is not lost
in a multi-page document.

The entire lease is only one

page that can be read meticulously in five minutes.
is no fine print, nor shoddy draftsmanship.
was

There

The agreement

negotiated, as evidenced by the hand-written term
20

requiring Reagan to provide a "canopy for Jennings front
window."

The language "for like successive period" does

not employ arcane legalese; instead it uses simple, plain,
straight-forward English.

To argue that such language was

skillfully drafted to be incomprehensible to a lay person
is a lacks any legal or factual support.
Appellant argues that the instrument is
substantively unconscionable, because, relying on the
language of Resource Management Company, it is so onesided.

Here again, there is nothing on the record to

support such an allegation.

According to the court in

Resource Management Company, "substantive
unconscionability is indicated by contract terms so onesided as to oppress or unfairly surprise an innocent
party."

Id. at 1041.

The affidavit of A.J. Reagan

clearly states that the original lessor had an opportunity
to read the document and to discuss its terms. (R.39)
That the original lessor understood its terms
and was not oppressed or unfairly surprised by its terms
is also evidenced by the harcrairu ncr between the parties,
the result of which is handwritten on the lease.

How the

original lessor induced his successors in interest into
purchasing the land is a different matter entirely.

Both

successors had an opportunity to read the language of the
lease before they purchased the land. Both appear to have
simply relied upon the hasty advice of title companies and
21

attorneys.
Miller cited the case of Logan v. Time Oil
Company, 437 Po2d 192 (Wash. 1968), for the proposition
that the provision the ten-year extension lacked in
mutuality.

Logan is a three paragraph decision, issued

PER CURRIAM without any disclosure of the rationale for
the decision.

It's hardly dispositive of the issue, and

is not binding case law.

A reading of this case fails t

provide any information that would be helpful in the cas
at bar.

V

Reagan Outdoor Advertising Is Entitled To
Judgment As A Matter Of Law

Even if the court finds that there is an issue
as to some material fact(s), summary judgment is still
proper when the moving party is entitled to judgment as
matter of law.

See Heglar Ranch, Inc. v. Stillman, 619

P.2d 1390 (Utah 1980) (summary iudqment is appropriate
even if some facts remain in dispute if a material fact
genuinely controverted).

As this court held in Themy v.

Seagull Enterprises, Inc., 595 P.2d 526 (Utah 1979):
We consider the evidence in the light most
favorable to the losing party, and affirm
only where it appears there is no genuine
dispute as to any material issues of fact,
22

or where, even according to the facts as
contended by the losing party, the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.
Id. 529.

See also Thornick, 604 P.2d at 934 (on review,

the court must determine whether there is any genuine
issue as to any material fact, and if not, whether the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law).
The interpretation of contractual language is a
matter of law:
The accepted principle is that the interpretation of a contracts language is
usually a matter of law. . . If its terms
are clear and unambiguous, summary
judgment is proper. Even where some
ambiguity exists in the contract,
resolution of the ambiguity is still a
question of law for the court.
Overson v. W.S. Fidelity & Guaranty, Co., 587 P.2d 149,
151 (Utah 1978), citing Central Credit Collection Control
Corp. v. Grayson, 7 Wash. App 56, 499 P.2d 57 (1972).
Consequently, even if the court accepts the general
allegations of the Plaintiff, it is still a question of
law for the court and not for the jury.
Judge Uno found in his Amended Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law that the contract was not
"unconscionable at the time the lease was signed."
Conclusions of Law, Paragraph no. 7; and that there was
"no ambiguity in the phrase for a 'like successive
period.'"

Conclusions of Law, Paragraph no. 9.

nothing to indicate that these conclusions are
23

There is

unwarranted.

Consequently, this court should uphold the

decision of Judge Uno.

CONCLUSION

Judge Uno's order granting Reagan Outdoor
Advertising's Motion for Summary Judgment should be
affirmed.

The language of the agreement, when construed

in accordance with the rules of English, shows that the
lease was to continue for one successive ten-year term on
the same conditions as the first ten-year term.

Lessor's

right to terminate the agreement arises only after
completion of the second term, as evidenced by the
post-semicolon clause in paragraph 4 of the Agreement.
Only the latter clause allows the lessor to terminate, and
the latter clause is of no effect until after two
successive ten-year terms.
Appellant has not raised any material issues of
fact that would preclude summary judgment in favor of
Respondent.

Many of the points raised by Appellant, even

if material, are based on pvi.flotu-o I Inf- would be
inadmissible at trial.

The Agreement can be interpreted

as a matter of law, and there has been no evidence to show
that the written agreement does not document the intent of
the contracting parties.

As a result, the contract, as a

matter of law, must be interpreted as the agreement and
24

intent of the parties.

DATED this

l(r?>Mr

day of December, 1988.
Respectfully submitted,

Douglas T. Hall
Attorney for Respondent
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served 4 copies of
Respondent's Brief upon the appellant by mailing same,
first class postage prepaid, to Suzanne Marelius, attorney
for appellant, at 426 South, 500 East, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84102, this

/ & & day of December, 1988.
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